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FINANCIAL  CAPACITY,  RELIQUIFICAIION,  AND PRODUCTION 
IN AN ECONOMY WITH LONG-TERN  FINANCIAL  ARRANCEMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
This paper characterizes  a  multi-period  production  economy  in  which 
borrowers  and lenders enter  long-term  financial contracts.  A key feature  is 
that aggregate  production  and borrowers'  capacity  to absorb debt  -  their 
"financial  capacity" 
-  are jointly  determined  endogenous  variables,  in the 
spirit of Gurley  and Shaw (1955)  Expectations  of future economic  conditions 
govern  financial  capacity,  which in turn  influences  current  capacity  util- 
ization.  Further,  diaturbances  in the present may persist  into the future 
by influencing  borrowers'  net asset  positions.  Finally,  borrowers  may sub- 
stitute future  for current production  by preserving  their  assets  in  hard 
times, behavior  akin  to  reliquification  as described  in Eckstein  and Sinai 
(1986). 
Mark  Gertler 
Department  of  Economics 
University  of Wisconsin 
Madison, WI  53706 1.  Introduction. 
Understanding  how  small disturbances can induce  large output fluctuations 
is an ongoing quest in macroeconomics.  Recent  work,  beginning with  Bernanke 
(1983),  resurrects  the view  that financial  factors may play a part.1  The 
underlying  theoretical  arguments evolve  from extending agency  theories of 
finance to interternporal  equilibrium  settings.  Two related kinds of  results 
arise relevant to explaining business  fluctuations,  First,  mechanisms which 
magnify the effects of  exogenous disturbances on  real activity may emerge  as a 
consequence of  the agency  problems.  Second, accelerator  effects on investment 
demand may arise because the agency costs  introduce a wedge between the price 
of internal and (uncollateralized)  external finance. 
To keep  the problem manageable,  most of  these analyses abstract from 
settings where borrowers and lenders may enter ongoing relationships.  This 
feature  Is a  limitation, however.  It is  well understood  that gains  often 
exist  from  contracting  over multiple periods.  Further,  long—term arrangements 
are characteristic  of  real—world  financial markets. 
This  paper presents a tractable  intertemporal equilibrium  model of 
saving,  investment and production,  where borrowers and lenders are free to 
enter  long—term agreements.  These contracts may be an  arbitrary  finite number 
of  periods  in  length.  Part of the motivation  is to  demonstrate  that the 
qualitative results developed  in settings with  one—shot financial  contracts 
may. extend  to environments where multi—period arrangements  are possible.  A 
more important objective,  however, is to demonstrate  that this  kind  of 
environment  enriches the description of how real—financial  interactions  may 
contribute  to business volatility. 
In  models of  single—period  contracting, the net stock of  financial  assets 
1See Gertler  (1988)  for a survey. —2— 
the borrower  begins with  is typically a key determinant  of the agency  costs of 
external  finance.  Indeed, Sernanke and Gertler  (1987,  1989) exploit this 
relationship  to motivate  an  investment—accelerator  mechanisiu.2 An implication 
of having  multi-period  financial relationships  is that beliefs about future 
economic  conditions  can affect current agency  costs of  finance, as well.  One 
reason  this possibility  arises  is that borrowers  may offer as collateral 
claims  on  future earnings.  As a  net result, in the framework presented here, 
output in  any period  depends positively on the ceiling level of indebtedness 
that borrowers can absorb at the end of that period.  The ceiling,  in  turn, 
depends on  borrowers'  collateralizable  expected future profits, defined  below. 
This  feedback between aggregate real activity  and borrowers' financial 
capacity  is reminiscent of the arguments in  Gurley and 5Mw  (1956). 
A  second  type of behavior emerging here is that borrowers may  adjust 
production  to  self-insure  against fluctuations  in  their wealth.  In 
particular, they  may  cut back  production  by  more  than  is  essential during  hard 
times  in order to  preserve financial resources for future use.  The desire  to 
smooth  wealth  fluctuations may  arise because accumulating wealth  reduces 
subsequent  agency coats of  finance.  Substituting future  for current 
production  by  preserving assets in  bad times corresponds  to "reliquification, 
behavior  which Eckstein and Sinai  (1986) describe as important in  amplifying 
business  downturns. 
Section  2 presents the basic setting,  amulti—period production  economy 
with borrowing and  lending.  The  single period version of the model  is a 
variant of Grossman  and Hart (1983) and Farmer  (1985), frameworks  in which 
asymmetric information makes underemployment  possible in  bad states of  nature. 
The setting  differs from  Leach  (1988), who also allows for multiple  production 
2See  Calomiris and Hubbard  (1987) for a related theoretical  analysis, and see 
Fa.zzari,  Hubbard and  Peterson  (1988) for empirical support. —3— 
periods,  because  long—term  contracting  is permitted.  The motivation  and 
details also differ; here the concern is with  financial contracts,  whereas 
Leach studies employment  contracts. 
Section  3 presents  a  solution to  the multi—period  financial contracting 
problem posed in section 2 ,  then  constructs and  analyzes equilibrium.  Using 
insights  from  Green  (1987), a solution is found by  collapsing  the multi—period 
contracting  problem  Into a (backward) recursive sequence  of one period 
problems which  determine  the borrower's  end—of—current—period  wealth as a 
function of the period's state realization.  One difference  from  Green's 
problem is  that borrowers cannot consume negatively;  another is that they  have 
finite horizons.  The upshot  is that the long-term contract must satisfy a 
financial  capacity constraint,' a ceiling on the borrower's  interim 
indebtedness that is needed to let her credibly guarantee her final wealth 
will be  non-negative. 
Overall,  the environment  is rigged  so  that  in the absence of 
informational asymmetries  production each  period depends only  on  current 
economic conditions.  The agency problem not only  increases the sensitivity  of 
the equilibrium  to exogenous disturbances,  it also introduces temporal 
dependence.  Anticipated  future economic conditions may affect current 
production  because they  determine borrowers'  current financial capacity, and 
also because they influence  borrowers'  gains  from smoothing wealth 
fluctuations.  Current behavior persists  Into the future  by  affecting 
entrepreneurial  wealth. 
Sections  2  and  3  illustrate the main  arguments  in a setting with  only  two 
production  periods.  Section 4 demonstrates  that the qualitative  results of 
the previous sections extend  to the N period  case.  It also discusses some 
quantitative  differences.  Section 5 provides concluding  remarks. —4-. 
2.  The Economic Setting 
This economy lasts for three periods, denoted zero, one and two. 
Investment occurs in  periods zero and one; production occurs in  periods one 
and two.  There are a countable  infinity of  people, all who live the entire 
time.  Two kinds exist.  A fraction  ip are  "entrepreneurs' and  a  fraction  (l—ij) 
are "lenders."  Entrepreneurs  differ from lenders by having  access  to an 
investment technology described below.  Both  types care only about  consuming 
in the second period  and are risk neutral.  Each person  thus  maximizes  the 
expected value of her period two wealth. 
There  is one type of commodity, which  is perfectly  divisible.  Every 
person  begins  time with  units of it.  In each  period  except the last, two 
options are available for allocating the commodity.  First,  one may store  it 
as inventory.  A  unit stored  in  period  t—l yields r  units  in  period  t,  where 
the gross return  r  is exogenous.  Second, one aay convert the good into 
capital for use in a risky technology  that produces output  in the subsequent 
period.  In  the last period, individuals  simply eat the commodity. 
Each entrepreneur operates a  "project" Cone project per entrepreneur) 
which employs the risky technology.  All projects are identical cx ante  and 
work  as follows: In  period  t—i, the entrepreneur  installs capital for use in 
period  t.  Investing a unit of the endowment good at  t—l yields  units of 
period t capital, which fully depreciate  after one period's  use.  Let  i1 
be 
the quantity  of the endowment good invested at t-l and K  the amount of period 
t capital.  Then, 
K  =  C2.  1) 
The technology parameter  is deterministic,  though it say differ in value 
across time. 
Output  in period  t depends on a  productivity disturbance  and on  the —5— 
quantity  of capital employed in  production.  The random  variable  is 
independent  and identically distributed  over time and has the following 
two—point distribution: 
I  = 1  +  A  with probability n 
* =  (2.2) 
t  I  b  b  =1 
with  A > 0,  0 <  <  1,  and i  + 
b 
1.  Note  —  =  A  >  0.  The 
realizations  of  across  projects are mutually independent,  implying there is 
no  aggregate  risk (per project). 
Let qJ be project output  in period one given that  productivity  state j 
arises  (j = g,b);  quI period two output  given that state j occurs  in period 
one and state k occurs  in period two (k = g,b); x  and  the 
state—contingent  amounts of capital used  as input in  periods one and two, 
respectively;  and K  the period two capital stock selected  after state j 
arises in  period one.  Then  the production  technology  is given  by 
=  —  c(x)  (2.3a) 
K  a x  (2.3b) 
ik  kJk  jk  q  =y -c(y  )  (2.4a) 
a y  (2.4b) 
2 
The function  c() is twice continuously differentiable,  strictly  increasing 
and strictly  convex, with  c(0) = 0,  c'(O) = 0,  and c'(z)  -* w  as z-  =. 
Output in each  period  is a strictly increasing and strictly  concave 
function of the quantity of  capital Input.  While the entrepreneur  must select 
the capacity  level of  capital before the productivity shock  is  realized — It 
takes time  to install capital — she  Is able to  determine capacity  utilization —6— 
after this event.  Employing a unit of  installed capital costs c'() units of 
endowment at the margin, where c'()  is increasing in  the total quantity  of 
capital employed.  For this reason, the entrepreneur may choose to  operate at 
3  less than  full capacity when  the bad productivity state arises  (see below). 
Assume further  that 
> rio  (2.Sa) 
b  (2.Sb) 
Condition  (2.6a) ensures that capital input is always  higher in  the good  state 
than  in  the bad, while  (2.Sb) makes the incentive problem connected  with 
investment finance  interesting  (again,  see below). 
Information  is structured as  follows: The distribution  of  the project 
specific  productivity shock  is common  knowledge.  However, the realizations of 
both  and project output each  period  are the private knowledge of the 
respective  entrepreneur.  On the other hand,  investment and capacity 
utilization each  period  are publicly observable. 
Lenders' behavior  is simple  to characterize.  They  allocate their 
period  zero wealth  between loans to entrepreneurs and inventory storage.  They 
repeat  the process in  period one and consume in the final  period. 
The behavior of  entrepreneurs  is more complex.  Let the random variable 
—  Jk  be  the period  two wealth  of a  representative  entrepreneur and  '.1  be  her 
period  two wealth  contingent  on  states j and k arising  in periods one and two 
respectively.  The entrepreneur's  objective  is to  maximize 
3The  product  ton costs could reflect the use of intermediate  inputs or a 
variable factor  such  as  labor. The key feature of  the technology  is  that it is 
always  optimal to use less input in the bad productivity  state than in the 
good  one. —7— 
E{W2} 
=  Jk1jk  (2.6) 
ki 
where  E{  is the expectation operator and where  equals ir 
The  expected final—period payoff must satisfy the following  intertemporal 
budget  constraint: 
EW2} 










=  7tq,  E{q2 
=  ikqik  E{1} = 
where  the random variables  and  are period t project output and 
investment, respectively,  and where i 
is investment during  the first period 
contingent  on  state j.  Eq.  (2.7)  requires that 
E{2} equal  the sum of the 
entrepreneur's  initial endowment U0  and the expected present discounted  value 
of  project output  (the second  term) minus the expected  present discounted 
value of  the cost of Investing  (the third term).  The return  on  storage rt is 
the appropriate  discount  rate If there  Is inventory accumulation  in 
equilibrium  (So that r  is the competitive  equilibrium  interest rate — see 
below). 
If  the entrepreneur  needs to borrow, she will enter  into a financial 
contract with lenders in period zero.  In general,  the contract will specify 
the state—contingent  values of  all the publicly observable  variables  over the 
project's  lifetime and the state-contingent  payoffs for each  party.  Further, 
an  optimal contract will account for the possibility  that the entrepreneur  may 
want to misreport  the sequence of  productivity states.  The customary way to 
address  this issue  is to  restrict attention to  the class of  contracts where 
the entrepreneur  has no incentive to lie.  Let s(z)  be the reported —8— 
productivity state for period t,  given that state z was the true  realization. 
To induce truth—telling,  the entrepreneur's  payoff wsi(i) 2(k)  from 
misrepresenting  any sequence of  productivity outcomes  (j,k) cannot  exceed her 
gain  from  honest  reporting w.  Thus, a constraint on the contract  is that 
a  (2.8) 
Another restriction  is that the entrepreneur's  final wealth  in any  state 
cannot be  negative: 
a 0  (2.9) 
The entrepreneur may be a  net debtor  in the interim time.  This  differs from 
single  period contracting,  where accounts are settled immediately  at the end 
of each  period.  Debts may be rolled over  under long—term contracting.  The 
maximum amount will depend  on  beliefs about the entrepreneur's  future project 
returns, as  discumsed  below. 
All individuals act competitively.  Think of each  entrepreneur  as picking 
a contract  in period  zero to offer  lenders.4  Formally,  the contract maximizes 
the entrepreneur's  expected wealth  (eq.(2.6)) subject to eqs.  (2.1) — (2.5) 
and (2.7) — (2.9),  and to the feasibility  requirement  that physical  quantities 
Jk  j  such as  output  be non—negative.  The decimion variables are W  ,  K,  i, K2, 
J  J  Jk  J  Jk 
i1,  q  ,  q  ,  x ,  and  y  ,  for j = g,b and k = g,b. 
Once  a solution to the contracting  problem is found,  it  is easy  to 
characterize  the intertemporal competitive  equilibrium.  Since each 
entrepreneur  is identical cx  ante, each chooses the same contract.  All 
4  One could  introduce the fiction of  competitive  intermediaries  facilitating 
loans between  entrepreneurs  and lenders. Since  these institutions would  earn 
zero  profits and would not use any resources,  the analysis  that follows can 
still proceed safely  without reference to  them. —9-. 
contracts  therefore assign  the same state—contingent  values for project output 
and Investment.  Thus, f  denotes per capita output  in period t then  the 
weak  law of large numbers  implies, 
= 
1L  irq + r(W0 
- ji)  (2.  iQa) 
A  JkJk  A  JJ  ir  q  + r2(q1 
-  s  i)  (2.  lOb) 
kj  J 
In both eqs.  (2.lOa) and (2.lOb), the two terms on the right are per capita 
output from  project investment and inventory storage respectively. 
When informational asymmetries  are absent, the only  connection  between 
and  is that output  in the first period affects the quantity  of' storage  in 
the second.  There  is no interdependency  between period  one and period  two 
output from investment.  This Is because capital depreciates  after one 
period's use and because productivity shocks are i.l.d..  The presence of 
informational asymmetries  changes the situation.  At the aggregate  level, 
first period  output depends on  the perceived state of  the economy In  period 
two.  In turn, second  period output  (including output from  project Investment) 
depends on  the performance  of  the economy In period one.  The sections that 
follow  derive and elaborate these results. 
3.  Eqi.zlllbriuzn Under The Optimal Financial Contract 
The way to  solve  the long—term contracting problem posed  In  section 2 is 
to apply  the logic of  dynamic programming.  Following Green (1987), Imagine 
setting up an  account  balance which records the entrepreneur's  asset position 
as it evolves over time.  This account balance will be  the state variable in 
the programming  problem.  The period  zero entry is the initial endowment 
W0. 
Let W  denote  the entry  at the end of  period one contingent  on  state  j  (i.e. 
the contract adds W  — 
W0 
to the entrepreneur's account  In period  one if  state —10— 
J arises).  The period  two entry is the entrepreneur's  final  state—contingent 
payoff w  (so that W—  W  is the amount the contract adds to her account  in 
period two contingent  on  state k occurring). 
The optimal long—term contract is found by  working backwards  and first 
deriving the optimal contractual  arrangement for period  two from the vantage 
of period  one, given state j having occurred in period  one.  This amounts to 
solving a one period  contracting  problem, assuming the entrepreneur has an 
initial asset position  of W.  The solution yields a value function V(w) 
which  expresses  the entrepreneur's  expected period two payoff  as a function of 
W.  Once  V(W) is  obtained  it is then  possible to find  the complete solution 
by  moving back to period  zero and solving a  contracting problem  which  picks 
for j = g,b  to  maximize  the entrepreneur's expected final wealth. 
This section first derives the value function and then  subsequently 
solves  the complete  programming  problem.  It concludes  by  analyzing  the 
optimal financial contract and the associated real equilibrium. 
3a.  Construction  of the value function.  Suppose an  entrepreneur  is 
about to enter period  two with  an  account balance of W  resulting  from  the 
realization of  productivity state j in period one.  Her expected  final period 
wealth conditioned on this event  is by  definition 
E{W2 
= J}  =  kwJk  (3.  1) 
The problem here is to find  a contract which maximizes  (3.1).  The contract 
must  offer lenders a competitive return, implying 
jIC(kyik  — c(y) — W) = r2(K/O 
— W)  (3.2) 
The left side  of  eq.  (3.2) is the expected payment the contract  offers  lenders 
(after using eq.  (2.4a) to  eliminate qJ1  The right side is the opportunity —11— 
cost of the funds borrowed  (after using eq.  (2.1)  to eliminate  i1). 
Only  contracts  which  induce truthful reporting  receive consideration, 
following  the discussion  in section  two.  The issue arises here  because the 
entrepreneur  may want to pretend times are bad  when  actually the good 
productivity  state  is realized.  By  doing so,  she may  be able to substantially 
lower her obligation  to  outside lenders.  The relevant  Incentive constraint  is 
a  + Ayib  (33) 
An entrepreneur who falsely pleads hard  times must set capacity  utilization  at 
yib in  order to mimic the bad state.  Her gain  is the unreported  income 
(the difference  between yib  and  yJt)),  plus the  contractual  payment  Wjb. 
Eq.  (3.3) requires that this gain  from  deception not exceed  the payoff from 
honestly revealing  the good  state W.  It  is not necessary  to introduce a 
symmetric  constraint  to dissuade the entrepreneur from  dishonestly  claiming 
times are good;  it  is easy  to show  this constraint would  never  bind. 
The formal  contracting  problem  is to choose K, y  and  for k  = g,b, 
to maximize  (3.1) subJect to  (3.2),  (3.3),  the capacity  constraint  (2.4b), the 
non—negativity  constraint  on  final wealth  (2.9),  and the feasibility 
requirement  that K,  qik, Jk  a 0. The solution follows. 
The entrepreneur  will always  operate at full capacity  in  the good  state; 
it would only  be wasteful to install more capital than  needed  in  good times. 
Eq.  (2.4b) thus holds with  equality: 
y  (3.4) 
Input choice for  the  good  state  is  given  by 
— c'(y)] — 
r2/e2 
= 0  (3.5) —12— 
The first term  in  eq.  (3.5) is the expected marginal benefit from increasing 
y: the probability of  the good state times the gain in output from  employing 
an  additional  unit  of  capital  in that state.  The second  term  is the marginal 
cost  given  that increasing capacity one unit requires  investing 1/92 
units  of 
the numeraire good.  Let y  be the value of  yjg which satisfies  eq.  (3.5). 
Note that  it  is unaffected  by  the incentive constraint  (3.3);  is thus the 
Jg  5 
unconstrained optimal  (first-best) choice of y 
Input choice  for the bad state depends on  whether the incentive 
constraint  (3.3) is binding.  Let y' be  the value of y  arising when  the 
incentive constraint  is relaxed (i.e., the first-best  value of yTh.  Then 
from  (2.4a), yb  satisfies 
1 — cI(yb*)  = 0  (3.6) 
where  eq.  (3.6) incorporates the restriction  that ?  equals  unity  (see eq. 
(2.2).  )  In  the unconstrained  optimum  yD  adjusts until the change  in output 
at the margin  equals zero.  The cost of  financing capital  investment  is 
irrelevant  to  the decision  because there is excess  capacity n  the bad 
state.  Condition  (2.5a) guarantees that ytl  < y9  = K.  Nonetheless, 
operating at y  might not be feasible.  The problem  is that the bad—state 
input choice  affects the gain  from  falsely announcing  bad times.  Unreported 
income Ay"  is increasing  in  yit)•  To  credibly claim times are bad, the 
Jb  b 
entrepreneur  may  have  to  met y  below y 
When  the incentive constraint binds, the optimal contract  fixem the 
entrepreneur's  bad—state payoff  at its lowest feasible  value, zero; 
5  •  J  Since yg  does not depend on  economic conditions  in  period  one, neither y 
nor i  depend  on period  one outcomes  (i.e.,  y99 = yt and i9=  ib) 
In 
contrast,  yib is  state—dependent  when  the incentive constraint  is binding, 
as will  be seen  shortly. —13— 
WJb =  (37) 
Reducing  is desirable  because  it  lowers the entrepreneur's  incentive  to 
misreport the good  state as the bad. 
A condition  uniquely determining y  follows from  using eqs.  (3.2) and 
jb 




— yJb  =  , j  ,ib >  (3.8) 
Jb =  ,  otherwise 
where  is given by  eq.  (3.5); and where the function R(a,b) 
is the 
entrepreneur's  expected net gain  from  operating her project  in  period  t,  with 
a and b being the input levels for the good and bad  states  respectively.  It 
is given  by 
R(a,b) =  — c(a)]  + sb[b — c(b)] — (r/8)a  (3.9) 
Eq. (3.8)  (when it holds) restricts y  below yb" to  ensure that the 
entrepreneur's  payoff  from  honestly  revealing  the good  state is  at least the 
same  as her gain from  falsely announcing  the bad state.6 
Whether the incentive constraint  is binding depends on the entrepreneur's 
beginning—of-period  account balance.  A rise  in  enlarges  the amount  that 
the entrepreneur can commit to lenders should the bad state occur,  which 
consequently  raises  the payoff  that she can obtain  in  the good  state. W  thus 
increases  while  remains fixed  at  zero.  This relaxes the incentive 
6The  effect  of a rise in yR  on  the entrepreneur's  net gain  from  cheating 
(Ay  +  — J) is  A  —  > 0 (given  eq.  (2.sb)).  Thus, 
must decline to satisfy the incentive constraint. -14- 
constraint,  permitting input use during bad times, y, to rise. 
Differentiating  (3.8) yields 
jb  =  r2/Am[l 
-  a(l_c1(yD  )) >  0  (3.10) 
for  y  C [Qyb')  where  S = sb/A  <  1  (by eq.  (2.Sb)). 
If  is below  a threshold value, the entrepreneur cannot obtain  funds 
to  operate her project because she cannot offer  lenders a competitive  return. 
This value, J, is obtained by  setting y  = 0  in  eq.  (3.8);  and is given by 
W =  —  R2(y',0)/r2  (3. 11) 
The  number  —  14  is interpretable  as the entrepreneur's  period one "financial 
capacity,"  since it reflects the maximum in—debt  she can be at the end of 
period  one  in order to function in period two.  According to  eq.  (3.11), 
financial  capacity  equals  the present value of "collateralizable"  expected 
profits,  R2(y',O), the expected net project yield  when  the incentive problem 
7  is severest. 
Conversely, when  is greater than or  equal  to an  upper  lImit W,  the 
entrepreneur's  wealth is sufficient  to  guarantee that  the incentive  constraint 
is not binding at the first best allocation.  In  this region, yJt is  set at 
b'  —  b 
y  and is unaffected  by changes  in 14.  The  limit  14  is  found by setting y  = 
8 
y  and isgivenby 
7  R (y9  ,O) is "collaterizable"  because  it  is the secure  portion of expected 
future  profits, the amount that  can  be  guaranteed  no  matter how  bad the 
incentive problem gets.  This is because a  contract offered when  the incentive 
problem  is severest sets  yi9 at y9  (as always) and yb at zero.  Fixing  yb at 
zero guarantees the contract is always  incentive—compatible. 
8  —  b'  b  b'  b'  — 
Note that 14  >  W  since ir9Ay 
—  it (y  — c(y  )) > 0.  While  W  always  exceeds 
14,  it  may be less  than or equal to  zero if'the gain from  cheating  is not 
large.  Otherwise,  it is  positive. -15— 
= [Qyb• — R(y9•yb•)]/r  (3.12) 
A value function  expressing the entrepreneur's  expected  discounted  period 
two payoff  under the optimal program as a function of  W1,  for  t W,  is 
defined by 
V(W)  = [R(yy) + r2W1]/r2 
(3.13) 
Let V1 and V be the first and second  partial derivatives of  V(S) with 
respect to 
V1 = {1  — o[l—c'(y)l}1 a 1  (3.14) 
V =  - cl(y)[VJ]2.j  so  (3.15) 
Figure  1  illustrates  the behavior of V(W).  It equals zero at  W1  =  14, 
and is strictly  increasing.  The slope equals V, the shadow  value  of  wealth. 
The function  is strictly concave over  the interval (W,W), with  a slope 
exceeding  unity.  V 
exceeds unity  in this range  because additional 
increases  the entrepreneur's  expected  project return by allowing  y  to  rise. 
Further, V1  is negative because of  the concavity  built in  the production 
relation  (2.4a).9  When  W1 a 14,  V(W1) is  linear and its slope is  unity. 
Because yit is fixed at yb, aore W1 simply adds to the entrepreneur's  net 
worth  without affecting her expected project return. 
91n Bernanke and Certler  (1987,  1989), VL') is  convex over  a  region  where 
V() > 0.  This  increasing marginal return  to wealth  arises because project 
sizes  are fixed.  It introduces risk—loving  behavior to marginal  (less 
efficient)  entrepreneurs,  making  them  willing to  enter fair lotteries.  In  this 
paper,  project  size is variable continuously  and the production  technology  is 
concave; as a  result, V(') is strictly concave in the positive  orthant, so 
that risk—loving  behavior does  not arise. —16— 
Finally,  what are the effects of  changes in  the interest rate 
r2 
and 
the investment  technology  parameter  02? 
When informational asymmetries are 
absent, shifts  in r2  and 
02 
alter the level of capacity  investment and hence 
the quantity of  capital employed  in  the good state y9  (see eq.  (3.5)). Once 
informational  problems  are present, however, changes in  r  and 02 may also 
affect capacity utilization in the  bad state, y, in  a way  which  magnifies 
the overall effect on expected output.10  A rise mr2 lowers  capacity 
investment and therefore lowers y9  .  The  drop  in  y9  forces y  down  to 
dissuade  the entrepreneur  from  claiming hard  times  (presuming the entrepreneur 
is a net debtor; i.e., y9/92 
— W  >  0).  Conversely, a rise  inS stimulates 
capacity  investment  and y2  ,  thereby  increasing y  as  well. 
3b. Solution  to  the long—term contracting  problem.  We now  move  back to 
period  zero  and solve a contracting  problem for period  one which  determines 
the entrepreneur's end—of-period—one state—contingent account balance  W  (for 
j  = g,b).  Once  this is done,  it  is simple to  characterize  the optimal 
long—term contract. 
First,  express the entrepreneur's  expected discounted  final period  payoff 
in  terms of  the value function 
E{W2/r1r2} 
=  irV(&)/r  (3.  16) 
Next,  note that lenders must receive a competitive  return, which requires 
m(x  — c(x) —  W]  = r"0 —  WI  (3. 17) 
where eqs.  (2.1) and (2.3a) are used  to eliminate  i0 and qJ•U  Eq.  (3.17) 
10Farmer  (1925)  derives the result that the interest rate  affects capacity 
utilintion In this kind  of environment. 
"It is stratghtforwerd  to show  that if the entrepreneur  satisfies  the one —17— 
embeds the result that the quantity of  capital K  installed  in period  zero for 
use  in period one will equal  the quantity of input x9 employed  in the good 
productivity  state, in  analogy to the optimum for period two (see the previous 
section).  Thus,  - 
W0 
is the amount borrowed at time zero. 
As  before, restrict attention  to  contracts where the entrepreneur has no 
incentive to lie.  This requires 
V(W)  + V(W1')  (3.18) 
where the payoffs are measured  in terms of  period one wealth.  Similar to 
b  the previous case, Ax  Is the unreported  income the entrepreneur  earns from 
lying about  the good  state.12  It does  not enter the value  function on  the 
right side  of  eq. (3.18) additively  with  W1'.  This  is  because the entrepreneur 
cannot  use Axt'  to improve the terms of  her period  two contract  in the same way 
she can use  Wi',  else she would reveal  her dishonesty. 
Another restriction  is that the entrepreneur  must be able  to  honor  any 
liability she incurs at the end of period one.13  (She Incurs a liability  if WI 
is negative).  This requires 
period  budget  constraints  (3.2) and (3.17), then  she automatically  satisfies 
her lifetime budget constraint  (2.7). 
12The entrepreneur may  secretly store unreported earnings.  Her gain  measured 
in period  one wealth  is thus  r2Ax /r2 
= Ax 
13Here  It is assumed that contracts  are enforceable  so that the entrepreneur 
must honor  any liability she can feasibly absorb. This contrasts with 
sovereign  lending, where contracts are unenforceable and borrowers  are thus 
able to renegotiate  debts  (Bulow and Rogoff  (forthcoming)). The Bulow—Rogoff 
scenario may be relevant as well to domestic lending situations  where the 
punishments  that courts can inflict on  delinquent borrowers  are sufficiently 
limited.  Constraining  the ability to  enforce contracts here would strengthen 
the basic points  made since  it would further increase the importance  of 
borrower net worth. —18— 
V(Wb) a 0  (3.19) 
(Eqs.  (3.18) and (3.19) ensure that v(W5) a 0.)  If this condition  is not 
satisfied,  the entrepreneur cannot obtain  funding to operate her project  in 
period two, and thus cannot pay off her debt.  Because  it essentially  requires 
that  a  W, eq.  (3.19) may  be termed the "financial  capacity constraint"  (see 
the previous section,  especially eq.  (3.11)).14 
The multi—period  contracting problem thus collapses to  choosing W  and 
for j = g,b,  to  maximize  (3.16) subject to (3.17) — (3.19), plus the 
requirement  that x  be non—negative.  There are two key differences from  the 
one period  problem presented  in section 2.  First, the entrepreneur's  net 
financial position  can be  negative at the end of any production period  except 
the last.  This implies that the contract may offer lenders contingent  claims 
on  the expected future project rents  as a device  to improve the entrepreneur's 
current  incentives.  Second, even  though the entrepreneur  is risk neutral over 
period  two consumption, she is effectively  risk averse  at time zero  over 
period  one wealth, for a certain range.  The entrepreneur's  objective  is 
strictly  concave  in  over  a certain interval due to the role of period  one 
wealth  in  reducing agency  costs for period two.  She may thus  prefer  to smooth 
the realizations of W,  holding everything  else constant. 
The optimal arrangement  works as  follows:  Like  before, capital  input in 
the good state  is set at its first best value; here denoted x,  and  given  by 
14The condition  that  wealth be  non—negative — here  eq.  (2.9) — is 
commonly  known  as a "limited liability constraint"  (see Sappington  (1983)). 
The financial capacity  constraint,  in comparison, is a  restriction  on  interim 
wealth; it  requires  that the entrepreneur's  interim wealth  be  sufficient  to 
guarantee  that she can  feasibly satisfy any given constraint on her final 
wealth. —19— 
—  c'(x )) 
—  ne  = 0  (3.20) 
Further, when  the incentive constraint  is relaxed, capacity usage  in  the bad 
state  is fixed  at its first best optimum, xb, given by 
1 — c  Cx  )  =  0  (3.21) 
If the incentive constraint binds,  capacity utilization  in  the bad state 
is distorted,  also  as  before.  In this case,  the following  three conditions 
Jointly  govern  the values of xb  and 
V(W(Wb,x)) — V(Wb) 
—  = 0,  (Ic)  (3.22) 
and either, 
V(Wb)  0,  (fc)  (3.23) 
or, 
irb(l  —  —  ,tbA(l  — vvb)  0  (ws)  (3.24) 
The implicit function for the good  state payoff, W(Wl),xt), is obtained  from 
manipulating  eq.  (3.17); and is given by 
W(Wb,xb)  [R(x9,xb) + rW  (3.25) 
where 
R1(,  •)  is  the expected gain  from  operating a project  in period  one, 
defined by  eq.  (3.9).  is  decreasing  in  and increasing in x". 
Eq.  (3.22) is the incentive constraint modified by  using eq.  (3.25) to 
eliminate  W.  It is portrayed as  the (Ic) curve in  Figures 2 and 3.  The —20— 
curve  is downward  sloping  in the region  of the equilibrium.15  This is because, 
in this region, both  a rise in  x" and a  rise in W1'  increase the entrepreneur's 
gain  from  falsely  claiming bad times. 
Eqs.  (3.23) and (3.24) cannot  hold simultaneously.  The former applies 
when  the financial capacity constraint,  eq.  (3.19). is  binding.  It is 
portrayed  as  the (fc) curve  in Figures 2 and  3.  We  know  from  before  that the 
value  of W" which satisfies this restriction  equals minus the present value of 
expected period  two profits contingent on yb  equaling zero, — R(y9,0)/r2 
(= W).  Since this minimum depends only  on  anticipated period  two gains and 
not xb,  the (fc) curve  is horizontal. 
The financial  capacity constraint need not bind, however.  The 
entrepreneur  say prefer to  set  above W since she is risk  averse over  a 
certain  range  of  period  one wealth  realizations.  The benefit of  raising W' is 
to narrow  the spread between it and  W9.  The cost  is the decline  in 
15At any  equilibrium  point where the (ic) curve is binding, the slope  of this 
curve  is negative.  Further, the equilibrium  is unique. 
The (ic) curve's slope has the sane sign  as  the term Os  V8(l_ct(xb)_l, 
where 8 =  <  1  (see eqs.  (2.5b) and (3.10)). 0  may be  positive at x' = 
if v9 is sufficiently greater than  unity.  However, 0 is always negative  at 
any equilibrium  point below  x 
First suppose the intersection of  the (ic) and (fc) curves defines  the 
equilibrium,  as in Figure 2.  The (ic)  curve  intersects the horizontal  axis  at 
= R(x,0)  + 
r1W 
a W.  Because the (ic) curve must cut the (fc) curve 
from  above,  its slope must be  negative at  the intersection.  To  see that the 
equilibrium  is unique, note that any other intersection must lie to the right  of  the first  one since the (ic) curve is monotone.  However, a second 
intersection  to the right of  the first is impossible.  It  is easy  to verify  that 0 would  have  to be  negative at this point,  which is not feasible since 
the slope of the (ic)  curve has to be positive here. 
Now suppose the intersection of  the (ic) and (we) cui'ves defines the 
equilibrium,  as in Figure 3.  At this point, V8(l_c1(xb)_1  =  < 0 
(from eq.  (3.24)).  Thus  0 < 0;  and therefore the slope of  the (ic) curve  is 
negative at the equilibrium.  It is easy  to verify  that the equilibrium  is 
unique, using the sase  kind  of  reasoning as in  the previous case. —21— 
required  by the incentive condition.  Eq.  (3.24) reflects  this tradeoff; and 
in  this case,  It replaces  eq.  (3.23) as a  restriction on xb  and  Il'.  The 
condition sets  the expected  net benefit from  increasing xb  equal  to zero, 
holding constant Wb.  The first term  is the marginal gain, the entrepreneur's 
benefit from  rising in  response to  the increase in expected Output.  The 
second  is the marginal  cost,  her loss in expected utility from  having  the gap 
between  and  widened to  satisfy the incentive constraint. 
Figures 2 and 3 portray  eq. (3.24) as the (ws)  curve  (for wealth- 
smoothing).  The curve slopes upward.  A rise in  lowers the marginal cost 
of increasing x' by  reducing the difference between  the shadow  values of 
wealth  in  the good  and bad states.  Thus, xb must also rise to keep  eq.  (3.24) 
satisfied.  The restriction  Is never satisfied for values of  x' below a 
minimum xb  E (O,x).  Below  the marginal benefit from  raising x'  always 
exceeds the marginal cost.  This occurs because V/V  has a lower bound above 
zero (and below unity).  Finally, if x'  < Xb  .  then  <  W,  the minimum value 
of  wealth needed  to relax the incentive constraint (see  eq.  (3.12)).  Eq. 
(3.24)  requires that  <  when xb  < x.  This is possible only if  < ¶J. 
3c. Equilibrium.  Assume  parameters are chosen  to guarantee  inventory 
16 
accumulation is always positive.  The returns on  storage  r1 
and r2 
thus 
become  the period  one and two competitive equilibrium  interest rates. 
Correspondingly,  the state—contingent  quantities  defined in  the multi-period 
contract are equilibrium  values; and together with  eqs.  (2.lOa) and (2.lOb), 
they  define equilibrium per capita output for each  period. 
16There will be inventory accumulation in  period one if  W > x /O; and in 
period two,  if r(W —  Q) + z[x9 —c(x9 )] +  b[b(b  )1  > y  /e2. 
17The equilibrium  is Pareto—optimal.  The decentralized  equilibrium can  be 
reproduced  as a solution to a social planning problem with  suitably chosen 
weights assigned  to individual utilities.  See Townsend  (1988). -22— 
Since the first best  optimum  is straightforward,  this section 
concentrates on the case  where the incentive constraint  Is binding.  An 
Immediate result  is that period one capacity utilization  in  the bad state, 
must lie below its unconstrained  optimum to  satisfy the incentive condition, 
in  analogy to  the short-term contracting  problem studied earlier.  It follows 
that period one output  per capita  must be  lower than its first best value as 
well  (see eq.  (2.lOa)). 
An  outcome of  the multi-period setting Is that output may  exhibit 
positive serial correlation, due to the link between entrepreneurial  account 
balances and real economic activity.  Different kinds of  serial correlation 
are possible, depending on the Initiating disturbance.  An  entrepreneur's 
expected second period  output depends positively  on  her first period 
productivity shock ()  since her good state payoff,  exceeds  her bad state 
payoff, Wb (see eq.  (3.19)).  Since this shock is independent  across projects, 
however, the serial correlation  it  induces at the individual  level vanishes  in 
the aggregate.  In contrast,  economy—wide shocks  - shifts  In  the common 
technology parameters  (the es),  in the returns on  storage  (the rs), or in 
initial wealth  W — have  persistent aggregate effects as well.  Economy—wide 
disturbances  in  period  one affect  average entrepreneurial  account balances at 
the end that period; and in  this way, they  influence per capita  output in 
period  two. 
A  financial  mechanism also  makes beliefs about values of the period  two 
economy—wide parameters  matter  to period one behavior.  The exact  link, 
though, depends on  whether the financial capacity constraint  is binding along 
with  the incentive constraint.  Each  case is discussed below;  and the effects 
of  shifts  in period  one parameters  are detailed as  well.  It  is also 
demonstrated that behavior resembling reliquification  is possible when the 
financial  capacity constraint  is relaxed. -23— 
Case  1:  V(b) =  0.  The financial  capacity constraint  is  binding.  Eqs. 
b  b 
(3.22)  and (3.23) thus jointly determine x  and W  Figure  2 portrays the 
equilibrium  as the intersection of the (ic)  and (fc)  curves.  xb is below 
and U" is fixed at 1ts  minimum feasible  level U.  A rise  in either  initial 
wealth U  or the period one technology parameter 01 shifts  the (ic) curve 
rightward,  increasing xb  and leaving U"  unchanged.  Both  adjustments  relax 
the incentive constraint  by  permitting  the spread between U  and Wb to  widen; 
this allows xb to increase.  Per capita  output in  period  one thus rises. 
Further, the disturbances  are "positively' transmitted  into period  two.  The 
average end—of—period  account balance rises since  W' is greater  for every 
entrepreneur.  Expected per capita output for period  two goes up as a result. 
By  analogous reasoning, a  rise  in the interest rate r  shifts  the  (Ic)  curve 
inward, ultimately  lowering both  per capita output  In period  one and expected 
per capita output  for period  two. 
Anticipated  future  economic conditions also affect current behavior.  An 
expected  rise in the future technology  parameter 0  is expansionary.  The 
resulting  increase In expected period  two profits raises  the value of 
accumulating wealth  in  the good  state,  which relaxes the incentive 
constraint.  (Recall that V(W") is fixed at zero.  )  In addition  to this 
"incentive" effect, there  Is also  a "financial capacity" effect  that Is 
Think of  shifts in  any economy—wide parameters as  occurring  to 
contracting.  As a matter of theory, in this setting, the optimal contract 
will have  (the risk-neutral)  lenders perfectly  insure borrowers'  net worth 
against -contracting  fluctuations  In  aggregate  variables.  In  practice, 
however, this perfect insurance of borrowers against aggregate  shocks appears 
to rarely  arise.  In  the real world,  lenders are typically  risk averse, 
possibly  making  them  unwilling  to perfectly  insure borrowers against aggregate 
risks.  Also,  in  the context of  the example here, one could imagine that 
measurement  error and delay  in  the reporting of  aggregate quantities  could 
make it difficult  for individuals  to unravel the precise values of  parameters 
such  as 6; this could  make the overall costs of Introducing contingencies  on 
(estimates  of) 2  outweigh  the benefits. —24— 
reinforcing.  The anticipated  rise in future unencumbered profits raises  the 
maximum liability that the entrepreneur can  absorb  in the event of a  current 
bad outcome.  This lowers W",  allowing w  to rise, further reducing the 
entrepreneur's  incentive to cheat.  The Cf  c)  curve moves downward, dominating 
a  simultaneous  downward shift by  the Cic) curve, so  that xb increases on  net. 
Conversely, a  rise in  r2  reduces both  the shadow value of good  state wealth 
and financial capacity,  which  in turn  lowers x".  In  both  cases,  the effect of 
the disturbance  persists  into the second period, due to  the impact on  the 
average entrepreneurial account balance. 
Case  2:  VCWS)  >  0.  Improvements in the economic situation relax the 
financial  capacity constraint.  These  improvements are mirrored in rightward 
shifts  of  the Cic) curve andJor downward shifts of  the  (fc)  curve,  either of 
which  increases xb.  After a  point,  the intersection of  the Cic) and (ws) 
curves defines the equilibrium; the Cfc)  curve becomes  irrelevant.  As figure 
b  3 portrays,  x  is further below  x  than it would be if  the financial  capacity 
constraint was still binding  Cholding everything  else constant). 
Correspondingly,  lies above  W.  Entrepreneurs now  accumulate  wealth  in the 
bad state at the cost  of  production  being lower than otherwise. 
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This 
behavior resembles  reliquification;  and it arises here because the dynasic 
agency  problem introduces a penchant for wealth-smoothing  by  making an 
entrepreneur's  expected  earnings a concave function  of her account balance. 
As in case 1,  increases  in  4  and  U  relax  the incentive constraint, 
moving  the Cic) curve  rightwmrd.  The Cws) curve moves  leftward.  A rise in 
either paraseter  increases 1J.  Holding xb constant,  must rise to satisfy 
the entrepreneur's  desire  for wealth—smoothing  implicit rn  eq.  (3.24).  The 
combined effect of  the movement in  the two curves  is that  increases.  The 
19Calomiris and Hubbard  (1987) and Leach (1988) obtain  related results in 
environments  with  single—period  contracting. —25— 
overall  increase In per capita  account balances  implies that per capita  output 
in period  two will go up  as well.  Interestingly,  when  is initially very 
low,  the reliquification  effect  (the inward movement of the (we)  curve) may be 
sufficiently  strong to  make xb fall. However, as  nears W,  the marginal gain 
from  reliquification  declines, so that xb responds positively  to rises In 
arid 
81 
(I.e.,  the movement of the (ic)  curve dominates).  Conversely, an 
Increase in  r  moves the (Ic)  curve inward and the (ws) curve outward, in  the 
end  reducing  both  current and  future  output per capita.  Finally, the effects 
of  changes  in the period two parameters  82 
and r2 are indeterminate  in this 
case.  Unlike  the earlier case, the net impact on  incentives  is indeterminate; 
this is because V(Wb) is no longer fixed. 
With  enough  improvement  in the economic situation,  the incentive 
constraint  will not bind. For example, if U  or 8  increases sufficiently or 
r1 
declines  sufficiently,  then x' converges to its unconstrained  optimum  xt' 
The  (ic)  curve  moves far enough  to the right so  that it no longer  intersects 
the  (we)  curve  below 
4.  Extension  to  the N Period  Case 
First  Imagine adding  a period at  the beginning,  so  that time starts  in 
period  "minus one."  There now  exist three production  periods: zero,  one and 
two. The algorithm for solving the long—term contracting  problem here  follows 
closely  the one for the problem with  two production periods, presented  in 
section  3.  Let V°(W) be a value function which  expresses  the entrepreneur's 
expected  final consumption  under the optimal contract as a function of U, her 
wealth  entering  period  zero.  The period  zero value function V°() has the 
same general properties  as the period one value function V(),  derived  in 
sect  ion 3a.  There is a minimum, W0, below which  the entrepreneur  is too 
uncreditworthy  to obtain funding to operate her project;  i.e.,  V°(W0) 
= 0. —26— 
Over  the interval 
1W0,W0),  the function is  strictly concave with  a slope 
exceeding  unity because increments of  in this range reduce period  one 
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agency  costs.  Finally, V () is  linear with  a slope of unity  when  14  is 
greater than  or  equal to '  the  threshold value of  period  zero wealth at 
which  agency  costs vanish. 
The three period  contracting  problem collapses to  finding the 
state—contingent  values for period zero wealth,  and 14,  to maximize the 
entrepreneur's  expected final wealth.  This programming  problem is 
qualitatively  similar to the one presented earlier for the two period case 
since V°(.) has the general form  of V(').  The same can thus be said  about  the 
solution.  These conclusions  extend easily  to the N period case.  By  using 
backward  induction,  it  is straightforward  to show  that the value  function at 
any (admissible) period minus t,  V_t(.),  has the sane  general form  as the 
period  one value function V(S). 
Quantitative differences may  arise, of  course.  Extending  the number of 
production  periods increases the entrepreneur's financial  capacity;  that is, 
the minimum  initial account balance she needs to operate in  period minus  t, 
declines as  t rises.21  The minimum for the case of  three production 
periods,  is given  by 
= —  fR(x,0)/r  +  (4.1) 
As  before,  financial  capacity  (in  this  example,  - 
14, 
)  equals the present 
= V/[l_V8(i_ct(xb)]  >  1, where  is given by  eq.  (3.14). Further, V0 
is negative  in  this region, reflecting a diminishing  effect of  additional 
wealth  on agency  costs. 
optimal contract thus  may call for partial "debt-forgiveness"  in the 
event of a string of  bad project outcomes; this  arises simply  because the 
maximum  liability the entrepreneur can  bear  declines as the project nears the 
terminal period. -27- 
value of  collateralizable  future project rents,  defined in  section  3a. 
Lengthening  the horizon  increases this  present value, as a  comparison  of  eqs. 
(3.11) and (4.1) indIcates. 
Less clear  is tfie  temporal behavior of W, the wealth  level at period 
minus t required  to ensure functioning  at the unconstrained optimum  in each 
subsequent production  period.  This  value for the three period case, W,  is 
given by 
=  —  +  — R(y,y)]/rr  (4.2) 
It follows from  eqs.  (3.12) and (4.2) that W0 equals the present value of the 
sum of  the minimum  levels of  wealth that would alleviate  the Incentive problem 
each  period  under single  period contracting.22  If these minimum levels are 
positive  each  period then  W  rises as  the horizon Increases; more initial 
wealth  is needed  to perfectly ensure  that the entrepreneur's  account balance 
can remain  sufficiently  in surplus in  the event  of a sustained string  of bad 
project outcomes.  Conversely,  if they  are negative then  declines.  In 
this case,  lengthening  the horizon reduces the entrepreneur's  incentive to 
deviate from the first best.  This Is because the expected gain  from  honestly 
operating at the unconstrained optimum each  period  always exceeds the expected 
gain  in  unreported  Income, obtained from  falsely pretending  times are bad 
(see eq.  (4.2)). 
6.  Concludinm  Remarks 
This  paper  characterizes a multi—period production  economy in  which 
borrowers and lenders enter optimal long—term financial contracts.  A key 
is easy  to show  that  >  using the same basic means of  proof that W > 
W (see footnote  8). —28— 
feature of  the equilibrium  is that aggregate production  and borrowers' 
capacity to absorb  debt  — their  "financial capacity"  - are  jointly determined 
endogenous  variables,  in  the spirit of  Gurney and  Shaw (1955).  Expectations 
of  future  economic conditions govern  financial capacity,  which  in turn 
influences current capacity  utilization.  Further, disturbances  in the present 
may  persist  into the future by  influencing borrowers'  net asset positions. 
Finally, borrowers may substitute future for current production  by preserving 
their assets in  hard  times,  behavior akin  to reliquification. 
The exact determination  of  financial capacity and of how it may  feed 
back  into the real equilibrium  is of  course more complex than  this paper 
portrays.  A  major omission  is role of  financial intermediaries.  Certainly, 
secular movements  in financial  capacity are also  tied  to  the development  of 
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intermediation.  And breakdowns  in  intermediation are, likely a key  aspect of 
depressions.  Nonetheless, the factor emphasized  here, collateralizable  future 
profits, may  be  relevant as well to  explaining  the kind  of short run variation 
in financial capacity  needed  to  make the general story apply  to ordinary 
business fluctuations.  Finally, while the analysis makes no  attempt to  model 
growth, it does suggest that the evolution of  productivity  (profitability)  in 
an  economy and of  financial  capacity may be intimately—connected  processes. 
23See Bencivenga  and Smith  (i988) and  Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1988) for recent 
treatments  of  the role  of  financial  intermediation in  growth. 0 
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